

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD854928

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors;
Administrative/Operational Use; 16 JUN 1969.
Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Attn: FOR-OT-UT, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

AGO D/A per form 55

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (16 June 69) FOR OT UT 691199

19 June 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Depot Cam Ranh, Period Ending 31 January 1969

AD854928

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals

US Continental Army Command

US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants

US Army War College

US Army Command and General Staff College

US Army Missile and Munitions School

US Army Ordnance School

US Army Quartermaster School

US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

DISTRIBUTION NO FOREIGN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT
(ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

CORRECTED COPY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY DEPOT CAM RANH
APO 96312

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

THRU: Commanding Officer, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh,
ATTN: AVCA CR-GO-P, APO San Francisco 96312
Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command,
ATTN: AVCA CO-O, APO San Francisco 96384
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam,
ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific,
ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Section I Operations: Significant Activities.

A. General.

(1) During the reporting period all directorates of the depot were involved in operations for a period of 92 days.

(2) The following battalions were transferred to US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh effective 1 November 1968.

- (a) 191st Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)
- (b) 262d Quartermaster Battalion (POL)
- (c) 69th Maintenance Battalion

B. Directorate for Management.

(1) Personnel Assignment and Rotation

(a) Mr. John C. Davidson, DAC, GS-12, was assigned Director of Management.

(b) 1LT Michael T. Serizawa, QMC, was reassigned duty with Liaison Customer Assistance Office.

(c) SFC Thornton Jones, NCOIC, departed to CONUS with assignment to USCONARC, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

FOR OT UT
691199
Inclosure

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(d) SSG Harry E. Saul was assigned as NCOIC.

(e) PFC David Horwitz was assigned as Illustrator.

(f) SP4 Richard W. McMahon departed to CONUS on PCS and was replaced by SP4 Reginald Crosby on 18 January 1969.

(2) Reimbursable Support of Non-Army Agencies.

(a) The depot continued to furnish substantial support to Non-Army customers on a reimbursable basis. Shown below is the dollar value rendered and the number of documents forwarded to US Army Pacific during the reporting period.

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DOLLAR VALUE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF REQUISITIONS</u>
I	1,560,394	307
II & IV	134,514	571
III Pkg	16,485	75
IND GAS	6,863	58

(b) There has been a sizable increase in Class I issues to Air Force and Navy over the last period. All other classes remain slightly below that of the last period.

(c) The greatest decrease was in Class II & IV area which showed a decrease of \$266,520 over the last period.

(d) The volume of documentation forwarded to US Army Pacific showed a substantial decrease during the reporting period. The quarterly average was 252 reimbursable documents forwarded, considerably less than that for 1st Quarter FY 69.

(3) Review and Analysis.

(a) The Second Quarter Review and Analysis for the Depot was presented during January 1969. Adjustments were made to account for the transfer of the 191st Ordnance Battalion (Ammo), 262d Quartermaster Battalion (POL), and the 69th Maintenance Battalion to US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh.

(b) The Review and Analysis has proven to be an exceptionally valuable management tool for the commander and his staff.

(4) Reports of Survey.

During the reporting period, four Reports of Survey representing \$19,849 in losses or property damage were reviewed prior to forwarding to the installation commander. There was a decrease of \$51,443 in the survey action reviewed during this reporting period over the past period which is attributed to the loss of three battalions to US Army Support Command.

Inclosure

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(5) Reports Control.

Updating has been accomplished to include the loss of reports due to the reassignment of the three battalions.

(6) Cost Reduction Program.

(a) A Standard Operating Procedure was developed for the Cost Reduction Program, during the early part of the quarter and was published 6 December 1968.

(b) This SOP included Project Maconomy, Management Improvement, Individual Cost Reduction Actions and Project Smart with forms and procedures to follow for implementation of these programs.

(c) The regulation was developed and published on 20 December 1968.

(d) Project Smart has been implemented with appointment of a LIP council to review ideas submitted by individuals. Thirty ideas have been submitted and reviewed with seven converted to beneficial suggestions which may lead to Cost Reduction actions.

(7) Zero Defects.

The Zero Defects Program is presently being formulated for presentation to the Commanding Officer and staff for approval. It has been noted that the Storage Division has developed some ZD posters for some of their divisions. The program should be well under way during the next quarter.

(8) Preparation for Manpower Survey, April 1969.

Schedule X's have been prepared in draft for each organizational element following orientation and training. An in-depth review, critique and rework phase is in progress toward refining the drafts into final form.

C. Directorate for Administration.

(1) Awards and Decorations.

93 awards were processed during the period. (See inclosure 1)

(2) Strengths.

Strength at the beginning of report period (1 Nov 68) was 2120 Military, 25 DAC, and 340 LN. At the end of the period (31 Jan 69) was 2187 Military, 40 DAC, 860 LN.

(3) Casualties: One.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(4) Reenlistment rates for the quarter were: Career RA, 86.6%; 1st Term RA, 5.1%; AUS, 0%. (See inclosure 2).

(5) Mail.

17,610 pieces of official mail were distributed. (See inclosure 3).

(6) Promotions.

38 were promoted in enlisted grades E6 to E9. (See inclosure 4).

(7) Court Martials.

26 Special Courts and 4 Summary Courts were conducted. (See inclosure 5).

(8) Chaplain Activities.

(a) Religious Services. Nine services for Roman Catholics, eight for Protestants, two for Jews and six denominational services were available for personnel of US Army Depot and Troop Command.

(b) Character Guidance.

Nine Character Guidance classes were conducted each month during the quarter.

(c) Special Activities.

(1) Depot Chaplain was host for the quarterly 1st Log Chaplain's Depot Chaplain Conference.

(2) Depot Chaplain received and briefed the Staff Chaplains from MACV, USARV and 1st Log Headquarters.

(3) Chaplain (CPT) David Pierce assumed duties as Assistant Depot Chaplain during October 1968.

(9) Visitors.

During the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969, the Depot was host to seventeen distinguished visitors. (See inclosure 6).

D. Directorate of Supply and Transportation.

(1) Supply Operations and Changes within the Storage Division.

(a) Retrograde Program: The Retrograde Program has been changed from "Clean Sweep" to "Excess Reduction" and a greater emphasis has been placed in this area. As of 1 November 1968, a field grade officer was assigned as Excess Reduction Project Officer, and the retrograde tonnages increased 300% during the quarter.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(b) At the direction of 1st Log Command, procedures have been initiated to relocate stocks by Material Category. A survey of locations and quantities of stocks on hand is being made to designate areas and warehouses for specific MAT CAT's. This program will be accomplished by attrition with a minimum of rewarehousing.

(c) In order to insure a smooth transition to 3SVN, this division was restructured to provide an organization which approximates the flow of material and to provide for a Central Document Control Section. Procedure Flow Charts were developed and implemented for all operations.

(2) Organizational Changes. Receiving Document Control, Shipping Document Control and Central Document Control were combined into one section, Storage Document Control. This consolidation has significantly increased the efficiency of these operations.

(3) Personnel.

Shortages in all areas are critical and with projected losses the situation will become worse. At this time, every effort is made to predict workloads and thus attain maximum utilization of available manpower. Local National training by enlisted personnel have been implemented in order to accomplish this end.

(4) Training.

During the quarter, Procedure Flow Charts were developed on all Storage functions. These basic logic flow diagrams were translated into Vietnamese and will form the base for both Enlisted and Local National training in storage functions.

(5) Supply Operations and Changes within the Quality Control Division.

(a) A Technical Inspection of batteries in storage was conducted 15-30 November 1968.

(b) Location Survey and Inventory Verification - A continuing weekly project.

(c) Project Time Frame - A study of the amount of time between physical receipt of items in the depot and the posting of the receipt to the ABF, with a breakdown of the amount of time spent in each area, was conducted between 28 November and 29 December 1968.

(d) Unitization-Packaging of SEA Shipments - A continuing quality assurance program conducted by the Shipping Inspection Branch.

(e) Project Condition - A newly undertaken project which will provide a onetime condition classification of all depot stocks, undertaken in conjunction with Project Count II, in order to provide the condition code information necessary under the 3SVN program.

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(6) Organizational Changes.

(a) The Storage Inspection Branch was activated on a limited basis with the receipt of two DAC commodity inspectors and the assignment of additional NCO personnel.

(b) The Receiving Inspection Branch was placed on a 24 hour operational basis effective 6 January 1969, which enables the Division to immediately condition code all receipts as they arrive in the Depot, and conduct surveillance inspection of receipts on a continuous basis.

(7) Personnel. One additional officer was assigned 11 November 1968 to bring the division to full strength on officer strength. Three DA civilians were assigned, one as the Deputy Chief of the Division, and two to the Storage Inspection Branch. Two NCO's were temporarily sent to Project Count in late November 1968. One was returned to the Division control in early January 1969, and a replacement was received for the other shortly thereafter. In late December and early January, one military and three LN clerk typists were assigned to alleviate one of the Division's most critical personnel shortages, although the LN's are at present largely untrained. Despite the assignment of additional NCO's to the Division, a critical shortage of military and DA civilian inspectors still exists, leaving the Storage Inspection Branch short five military and six DA civilian personnel.

(8) Training. All key personnel attended selected classes on 3SVN in December 1968. Two NCO's attended a two week course in Care and Preservation in January 1969. Due to personnel shortages, extensive cross-training was conducted throughout the period to enable the Division to draw upon any branch to conduct special reports/projects. Most notably, every man in the Division has taken part in conducting the weekly Location Survey and Inventory Verification Project, and individuals from the Receiving and Shipping Inspection Branches have often participated in various QC Storage Inspection activities.

(9) Supply Operations and Changes within Transportation Management Division.

(a) The Shipment Planning Branch, during this quarter, has perfected a semi-automatic system of booking master Transportation Control Movement Documents. This system has reduced error probability, eliminated cumbersome, laborious methods of bookkeeping, and greatly increased the efficiency of this branch of the Division. Personnel may now be utilized in a more productive manner; and the accuracy of reports, statistics, and coordinating information available to the Transportation Management Division has been greatly increased. This has resulted in a general improvement of the Shipping Planning Branch.

(b) On 16 December 1968, representatives from the Army Transportation Command (Provisional), Cam Ranh Bay and Cam Ranh Army Depot met to discuss movement coordination problem areas. Resolutions for these problem areas were made and jointly endorsed. This action constituted a major step toward the smoother flow of cargo through this command.

(c) Commencing 1 January 1969, all convoy loads have been pre-planned by the Shipment Planning Branch. This action has resulted in more effective utilization of Transportation Command vehicles. The program has decreased confusion and increased the efficiency of convoy loading operations.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(10) Organizational Changes.

(a) In compliance with recent directives from higher headquarters, the CONEX Containers Marshalling Yard has been reorganized from an area with the primary mission of shipping CONEX containers to an area that is now utilized to stockpile these CONEX Containers. In addition, a request for a CONEX Repair Facility has been prepared and submitted to the First Logistical Command.

(11) Personnel. During the last quarter of 1968, the Transportation Management Division lost two officers. The loss of these officers has been keenly felt but has been lessened by the assignment of four senior NCO's. This Division had a net increase of 37 military personnel and 17 Local Nationals during the last quarter, and shows projected loss of 16 military personnel during the next quarter. The number of new personnel offsets the potential loss of experienced manpower and, as a result, this Division looks forward to even greater accomplishments during the next quarter.

(12) Training.

(a) During the month of October 1968, Local Nationals were introduced into the labor force of the Documentation Branch. Difficulties were initially experienced in the efficient utilization of these personnel due to the language barrier, difficulties in educational qualifications, and cultural standards. Much progress has been made during the past quarter to effectively overcome these barriers. This improvement has been accomplished by weeding out those personnel who were unqualified, sending those who showed potential to English classes and typing school, and finally by the patient perseverance of the assigned military personnel in training these Local Nationals into effective productive employees. The success that this Branch has had in training these Local Nationals was perhaps best exhibited by the results of the 1st Logistical Command Regulation 525-2 Inspection Team when the Documentation Branch was rated "outstanding in every respect" during the teams December inspection.

(b) During the past quarter, the Port Branch was allocated Local Nationals to assist in the cleaning and processing of CONEX Containers in the CONEX Marshalling Area. Again, through patience and prior planning on the part of the assigned military personnel, these Local Nationals have been effectively utilized within the area.

(13) Supply Operations and Changes within the Unserviceable Property Division. The Unserviceable Property Division has engaged in 92 consecutive days operation. During the period 1 November 1968 to 26 January 1969, the activity received 9,771 short tons and shipped 5,782 short tons.

(14) Organizational Changes. The Division did not undergo any operational changes during this reporting period. However, SOP's were developed to provide guidance and direction to the various sections.

(15) Personnel. The Division received two DAC's who are specialists in packing, crating, and shipping operations. These individuals are working with the assigned military personnel in order to provide expert guidance at the operating level.

AVGA CR-D-MYT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(16) Training. CONUS based instructors conducted classes on packing and crating operations for air shipments.

(17) Supply Operations and Changes within the Stock Control Division.

(a) After many months of preparation this Depot converted to 3SVN. The Customer Assistance Liaison and Red Ball Branch were assigned to this Division for operational and functional control. The planning and scheduling of inventories have also been assumed by this Division. A program to expedite the processing of 15,000 line items of excess stock from Vinnell Corporation was completed during this quarter. Through close coordination with the 14th ICC approximately 12,000 line items were retrograded to Okinawa (AT 6508) and 3,000 line items were returned to depot stock.

(b) Stock Management Branch. This Branch assumed the function of monitoring and control of exception cards being forwarded to the commodity sections. Controls are necessary to insure all exception cards be returned for re-entry.

(c) Engineer Construction Material Section. The conversion to the 3SVN system during the past three months necessitated changes in operational procedures. Under 3SVN it is necessary for the customer to submit requisitions for construction material directly to this section rather than through the normal supply channels. This enables the manager to edit and properly code requisitions prior to input into the cycle. Items must be properly coded for OMA and MCA customers. Complete edit prevents items from being kicked out as exceptions and assists the customer in obtaining his status and supplies without unnecessary delays.

(d) Subsistence Branch.

(1) During the past three months, this branch has been engaged in providing administrative Class I support to forces in II Corps area.

(2) The Class I supply point at Ban Me Thout is now supported through Nha Trang rather than directly from this depot.

(3) Tuy Hoa will be supported by Qui Nhon Depot starting in March, 1969.

(e) General Material Section: General Material converted to 3SVN during the first half of January. The new system has brought about changes in the specific items managed by this section and in the procedures required to process customer requisitions. Material categories managed by this section are E, (Industrial and General Supplies), F, (Clothing) and R (Chemicals and packaged petroleum products). Another important change in supply operations concerns walk-through requests. All customer walk-thru requests are now processed by Customer Assistance. This section no longer authorizes walk-thru.

(f) Firepower and Mobility Section: The last three months have brought many changes which can be directly attributed to our conversion to 3SVN. One of the most substantial changes was the revision to realign all material sections by Material Category (MAT/CAT). In addition to the above, this section has also taken responsibility for the Closed Loop Items Report. Under 3SVN the DSU's now submit all requisitions for PEMA Principle Items directly to USICCV. This change should be of great benefit to the

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

customer as it will enable them to deal directly with the controlling authority. This will also help the Depot as it will reduce the quantity of documents received and processed by the Depot.

(g) Ground Forces and Industrial Section: Effective 7 January 1969, this section converted to 3SVN with no foreseen difficulty to date.

(h) Electronics Section: During the past three months, conversion to a more expeditious system of supply was accomplished. At the present time this Depot is running a supply cycle every thirty-six hours which enables the item manager to give accurate and timely supply status to the inquirer. The major difference between the previous system and the present one is the distribution of output. Originally, output was distributed by Federal Stock Class; now, under Standard Supply System Vietnam, it is distributed to the item manager by Material Category Code. This necessitated the redistribution of some items among managers. However, in most instances, managers are presently managing the same items.

(i) Document Processing Branch: The most significant area of change in operation during the past quarter was the recent conversion to 3SVN procedure. The transaction was accomplished with a minimal amount of confusion due to the excellent training presented by the 3SVN Mobile Training Team. Card format and criteria for exception processing were phased in immediately with favorable results. The only area which required re-organization and re-distribution of personnel was the Technical Edit Section. Prior to actually initiating the new procedures, it was assumed that the greater workload would be in the Document Control area, but, while the exception card volume is greater in that area, the time consuming edit required in the Technical Edit Section placed the larger workload there.

(j) Customer Assistance Branch: During this quarter, the Customer Assistance conducted a backorder reconciliation with all depot supported customers. Each DSU with backorders over 60 days was visited and advised to cancel any backorders that were not necessary. As a result of this effort to cancel any backorders possible, a cancellation rate of 52% was obtained.

(18) Organizational Changes.

(a) Office of the Stock Control Division. There was a reorganization within all the material sections to realign material sections by Material Categories (MAT/CAT) due to 3SVN conversion. This required a movement of many Federal Stock Number (items) from one section to another but did not require a movement of personnel. The Customer Assistance Liaison and Red Ball Branch were transferred to the Stock Control Division from Operations Control Office, Director of Supply and Transportation.

(b) Stock Management Branch. A control desk was established in this branch to control the flow of exceptions and back up data for cycle output. All exceptions incoming and outgoing are controlled by the control desk.

(c) Engineer Construction Material Section. The keypunch activity in this section was discontinued with the conversion to 3SVN. The keypunch machine was moved to Document Processing Branch.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(d) Subsistence Branch. The internal organization is unchanged from last quarter.

(e) General Material Section. Internal grouping of items by Commodity Manager has been rearranged due to the 3SVN conversion. Every effort was made to insure the Commodity Managers retained as closely as possible the same item that they managed prior to the conversion.

(f) Firepower and Mobility Section. With the change to Material Category management it was necessary to reorganize and redistribute the workload within the section. There are six Material Categories in this section (H, K, L, M, and V).

(g) Ground Forces and Industrial Section. Prior to 3SVN this section was assigned a particular group of FSC classes and it was readily known whether or not the items were available. The only difficulty which creates a burden to the item manager under 3SVN is items are broken down by Material Category (MAT/CAT). In checking on items assigned a particular MAT/CAT the item may not appear, therefore, the item manager to be assured this item is available, has to check all MAT/CAT's.

(h) Electronics Section. With the ever increasing awareness of the importance of electronics items, several proposed changes have been made to MTDA P5 WO4 DAA 01 by Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. The Chief's position has been upgraded to Major (O4) from Captain (O3). The Deputy Chief has been changed to a civilian (GS 11). Also, in addition to these changes, a Stock Control Officer (O3) has been added to the section. With these changes Electronics Section becomes one of the larger sections in the Stock Management Branch.

(i) Document Processing Branch. No permanent realignment of personnel is being contemplated at this time. After sufficient experience is gained and a trend can be analyzed pertaining to 3SVN workload, appropriate recommendations for changes in internal structure will be submitted. A possibility under consideration is an increase of the night shift personnel with present manpower authorization.

(j) Customer Assistance. On 1 January 1969, the Customer Assistance Division was realigned as a branch under Stock Control Division. This realignment was in conjunction with the 3SVN conversion and necessary to alleviate the workload of the Commodity Managers, who must now manually process all exceptions that are generated within the supply system.

(k) Red Ball, MRE Section. The most significant change during the past three months was the realignment of this section under the Chief of Stock Control Division.

(19) Personnel.

(a) Personnel gains during the past three months due to realignment of responsibilities to this Division are as follows:

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

Customer Assistance Section

Red Ball Section

Officers	3
Enlisted Personnel	3
Local Nationals	<u>0</u>
Totals	6

1
<u>14</u>
<u>8</u>
23

(b) Personnel losses and gains during the past three months are as follows:

	<u>Losses</u>	<u>Gains</u>
Officers	2	1
Enlisted Personnel	12	11
DA Civilians	0	3
Local Nationals	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	14	15

(20) Training. Office of the Chief of Stock Control Division.

(a) All personnel received instructions and training for 3SVN given by the 3SVN Training Team, 1st Logistical Command. Personnel were further trained using test programs to stimulate actual working conditions. OJT is being conducted on a continuous basis until all personnel are thoroughly proficient under 3SVN. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP's) were prepared and distributed to all personnel to be utilized as desk guides during the transition to the 3SVN system.

(b) Subsistence Branch. At present time five people are being cross trained and are participating in an OJT program for procedures pertinent to Class I.

(c) Document Processing Branch. All military personnel attended the classes pertinent to their areas of responsibility which were given by the 3SVN Mobile Team. These personnel presented OJT to the LN's aimed initially at repetitive areas until they can achieve familiarity with the new procedures.

E. Directorate for Data Processing.

(1) There was no major personnel turbulence during the reporting period. Most of the Local National positions (32) were filled, with the predominant number of these being key punch operators. In addition, the following key US personnel changes were effected:

(a) Gains.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>EFFECTIVE DATE</u>
James E. Koleff	CW2	Computer Operations	18 Nov 68
Ronald N. Parrish	WO1	EAM Operations	15 Jan 69
William H. Weber	MSG	NCOIC	30 Dec 68

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(b) Losses

C. J. Fulda	CW2	Machine Operations	10 Nov 68
G. D. Boggiano	CW2	EAM Operations	19 Jan 69

(2) The USAICCV which was using this depot's installed computer equipment for system development purposes, completed its mission on 5 December 1968, and turned the equipment back to depot control.

(3) Immediately after depot obtained control of ADP equipment, preliminary 3SVN conversion operations were started. Files were actually converted during the period 31 December 1968 to 7 January 1969. The first regular 3SVN cycle was run on 8 January 1969. The entire 3SVN conversion went according to schedule, and no major difficulties were experienced. After conversion, 15 daily cycles and three weekly cycles were run during the month of January.

(4) There was a marked reduction in the amount of punch card data processing after conversion to 3SVN. The depot is scheduled for a manpower survey during the next quarter, and at that time the full extent of the personnel savings attributable to conversion from PCM to computer operations can be determined.

(5) No major changes are contemplated during next quarter. Effort will be devoted to quality control and more efficient ADP operations.

F. Director of Services.

(1) Under the Close Troop Program for MHE during the past quarter, 50 pieces of MHE were laterally transferred due to the reorganization under TDA and MTDA. Only one new piece of MHE was received from the Vehicle Park for issue to MHE.

(2) The number of Report of Surveys processed in the last quarter was 7.

(3) Last Quarterly Droppage for TDA property for period ending 31 December 1968 was approved by Dir Gen Sup, SUPCOM in the amount of \$590.25.

(4) Number of L/I stocked at the Depot Supply Point increased from 554 to 561 during the past quarter. A complete review of authorization cards on hand was completed and all units supported advised to update their cards. Cards are presently updated.

(5) The entire 2500 bundles of matting M8A1 assigned to the Consolidated Property Division for accounting purposes have been issued.

(6) Local procurement action is being continued with PBO SACCRB Imprest Fund Officer for additional rubber stamps required by Directorates.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(7) During the heavy rains of the last three months the equipment of this division contributed support to the Post Engineer in the repair of Post roads and ammunition storage areas that suffered severe washouts. Also during this time the equipment has repaired rain damaged areas within the Depot area.

(8) Projects undertaken during this period.

(a) Construction of approximately one mile of fair-weather road.

(b) Rehabilitation of the main thoroughfare of the Class I Yard (Delta Yard) which consisted of removing the M8A1 steel matting and replacing it with approximately 1000 cubic yards of gravel.

(c) Began work on a 400,000 square foot Drum Yard Expansion Area for the 262d Quartermaster Battalion.

(d) Planted approximately 1500 Australian Pines on a sand dune adjacent to the main entrance of the depot. At this time there is a survival rate of approximately 35 to 40%.

(9) The asphalt distributor (penesprime distributor) accomplished repair work on berms in tank farms and ammunition storage areas, and is at present conducting erosion and dust control work in the Engineer Class II & IV Yard.

(10) Twenty-seven Job Order Requests (DA Form 2701) were processed during this period.

(11) Issue Priority Designators

(a) USARV Reg 735-35 and LC Reg 700-40 require that the Commander, Deputy Commander, or Executive Officer authenticate the assignment of Issue Priority Designators (IPD) 02 thru 10 to supply requests. His signature is required on each 02 thru 10 request submitted and on the document register.

(b) The Cam Ranh Army Depot, organized under MTDA P5-WO4DAA-01, has one Commander and one Deputy Commander. Unlike a TOE organization, the TDA Company Commanders perform only administrative duties. Therefore, to comply with the referenced directives, the Depot Commander or Deputy Commander must sign all 02 thru 10 priority requests.

(c) The Depot Consolidated Motor Pool (CMP) and MHE Pool generate in excess of fifty (50) repair part requests daily priorities 02 and 05. By virtue of their busy schedules, it is near impossible for the Depot Commander and Deputy Commander to sign all these repair part requests and document register entries. As a result, equipment repair times and rates have been adversely affected by the delayed request submission.

(d) A request for authority to delegate this responsibility was submitted to 1st Logistical Command on 18 January 1969. As of this date a reply to this request has not been received. On 27-29 January 1969 the Consolidated Motor Pool and MHE Pool underwent a 1st Logistical Command Maintenance Management Inspection (CMMI). The only operation rated unsatisfactory was the repair parts (PLL) programs in both pools. This

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

was attributed to only one (1) deficiency received for having delegated the authority to sign O2 and O5 priority requests to the Chief, Operating Equipment Division. This is the only deficiency/shortcoming noted by the CMMI Team however, due to the scoring system, this one deficiency failed the entire repair parts program.

(e) Operational requirements do not enable compliance with the aforementioned directives. Pending approval of the request to delegate the authority to sign O2 and O5 priority requests, all of these requests will continue to be authenticated by the Chief, Operating Equipment Division.

(12) Interchangeable Repair Parts.

Due to the non-availability of starters for 6,000 lb and 10,000 lb Rough Terrain forklifts, the starters from other vehicles were tested as possible replacement. By rotating the head of a 2½ ton Truck (Multi-fuel) starter, it is a satisfactory substitute on a 6,000 lb RT Forklift. The starter of a 5 ton Truck (Multi-fuel) is a satisfactory substitute on a 10,000 lb RT Forklift, without rotating the head.

(13) Inner Hub Seals.

If extreme care is taken when removing the inner hub seals on a 3/4 ton Cargo Truck to pack the roller bearings, these seals can be re-used. Even pressure applied to the outer race of the bearings will cause the hub seals to come out without being damaged.

(14) Inner Axial seals.

By machining down the flange of the inner axial seal for the 2½ ton Cargo Truck, M35A1, it can be used on a 2½ ton Cargo Truck, M35A2. This can best be accomplished by using a machinist lathe trimming the seal approximately one-eighth inch.

G. Troop Command, USAD-CR:

(1) Operations, Significant Activities.

(a) Since the last report of this nature, Troop Command has undergone several significant changes. At the beginning of November, D Company, an assigned unit, was inactivated upon implementation of MTDA P5 WO4DAA01. One of the primary purposes of the MTDA was to minimize the number of Depot Directorates for which each company had to provide personnel (under MTDA each company, with the exception of HHC, deals with only one Directorate, which is a very admirable improvement over the TDA.) When D Company was inactivated, its personnel were reassigned to the other four companies (HHC, A, B, C) according to their depot functions (by MTDA paragraphs and line numbers). However, the D Company personnel were by no means the only ones effected by the MTDA. All in all, approximately 800 men were shuffled to assign personnel to the company serving their Directorates.

(b) On 1 November 1968 Troop Command lost operational control of the

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

Security Guard Company, with the exception of the 3rd Platoon, to the 191st Ordnance Battalion. The 3rd Platoon remained under the operational control of the Depot Physical Security Officer. However, Troop Command continued to provide administrative support of the entire company.

(c) On 20 December 1968, the 623d QM Co (AER&D), one of Troop Command's two attached units, was inactivated and redesignated the 194th QM Detachment, composed of 1 Officer, 1 WO, and 36 EM. The 109th QM Co (AD) absorbed all of the excess personnel from the 623d.

(d) In late January the Depot Physical Security Officer physically moved out of Troop Command Headquarters to come under the direct control of the Depot Deputy Commander.

(e) In spite of a seeming preoccupation with various reorganizations, much emphasis has been in the areas of processing legal work and routing personnel actions, emphasizing safety, and monitoring Morale, Character Guidance, and Civic Action Councils.

2. Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel.

(1) Key Punch Operation.

(a) Observation: Local National personnel can be trained to carry on the bulk of required key punch operations.

(b) Evaluation: For those who cannot type or speak English, preliminary language training and typing training is helpful, but not essential. Approximately 30 days OJT are required to train unskilled local nationals to perform minimum production key punch operations.

(c) Recommendation: Where the situation permits, most key punch operations should be performed by Local Nationals.

(2) Clearing of Officers assigned to US Army Depot units.

(a) Observation: The problem of Hand Receipt holders not clearing their H/R still exists. Recently two or three more cases have arisen causing supply action to be suspended until a new hand receipt holder can be appointed, property inventoried and accounted for and signed for. Property found missing as a result of inventory will have a Report of Survey initiated.

(b) Evaluation: There are occasions arising where the hand receipt holder extends and departs on leave. In some cases this does not hamper the operations of his unit or section. In other cases the H/R holder is the only person authorized to requisition and/or receive supplies. Any hand receipt holder going on leave, TDY, etc. should have his property inventoried and signed over to a new hand receipt holder.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(c) Recommendation: Recommend that CO, Directorate and Unit Commanders have the above brought to their attention so as not to hamper the operation of their unit and to assist the Consolidated Property Division in maintaining accurate and up to date records.

(3) Company Drivers.

(a) Observation: Presently, operator's maintenance on overhead vehicles is performed by company clerks, armorers, and mail clerks.

(b) Evaluation: Because of the tremendous size of Troop Command companies (from 325 to 400 men), the workload of the above personnel precludes allocating sufficient time to satisfactorily perform maintenance of vehicles.

(c) Recommendation: That additional personnel be authorized in company overhead to perform above mentioned duty.

(4) Personal Hire Maids.

(a) Observation: The large number of maids in the company areas caused many squabbles among the troops and the maids were a probable source of marihuana, dangerous drugs and prostitution.

(b) Evaluation: It was decided that to minimize the problems caused by these maids, only NCO's would be authorized to employ them and a program, under the strict control of the 1SG's has decidedly reduced the above mentioned problems.

(c) Recommendation: None

(5) Utilization of Vietnamese Local Nationals.

(a) Observation: Due to existing shortages of key enlisted MOS's it has become increasingly important to fully utilize Local Nationals. The limiting factors in this utilization are both the language barrier and the total unfamiliarity of the LN with the system. Before any real progress in this area can be made all storage operations had to be expressed in the most basic terms.

(b) Evaluation: By depicting each separate operation in a step by step logic flow chart it was possible to reach this basic level. The translation of these charts into Vietnamese then provided a solid foundation for Local National training.

(c) Recommendation: That logic flow charts, in both English and Vietnamese, be used to train Local Nationals in systems which may be complicated or unfamiliar to them and to overcome the language barrier.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

b. Operations.

(1) Reconciliation of Cargo Shipments.

(a) Observation: Reconciliation of cargo shipments to the ultimate consignees is difficult since these consignees often fail to answer correspondence mailed to them by the Transportation Management Division Documentation Branch. The Documentation Branch mails copies of all master Transportation Control Movement Documents to the ultimate consignees. This procedure provides a notification of shipment of cargo for the consignee and, when signed and returned, they provide a complete reconciliation of cargo shipment to the consignee. Since several of the customers served by this command are not in the 1st Logistical Command chain of command, it has been difficult to obtain a greater return of consignee confirmation.

(b) Evaluation: Until such time as a program can be established in which all RVN consignees are required to cooperate in cargo shipment reconciliation, there is no adequate means of tracing cargo from the shipper to the ultimate consignee.

(c) Recommendation: That a USARV Regulation be published requiring all RVN consignees to cooperate in cargo shipment reconciliation.

(2) Loading Convoy Vehicles Efficiently.

(a) Observation: In order to efficiently load vehicles for a convoy, close coordination between the shipper and the mover must be maintained. Representatives from US Army Transportation Command (Provisional), Cam Ranh Bay and Cam Ranh Army Depot met during the first part of January 1969 and established a system whereby convoys could be preloaded by the shipper. It was the hope of this meeting that the establishment of a system whereby convoys could be preloaded and would increase the efficiency of convoy outloading procedures.

(b) Evaluation: It has been noted that the outloading efficiency of convoys has been increased by preloading of all convoy vehicles. This procedure eliminated much of the last minute coordination and often allowed for more completely utilized vehicles.

(c) Recommendation: That the present convoy loading procedures be perpetuated and further refined. These procedures have proven themselves to be both effective and efficient in utilization of transportation assets.

(3) Weekly Inventory Verification by Quality Control Division.

(a) Observation: With the completion of Project Count I, the Quality Control Division weekly inventory verification was conducted against the mechanized Asset Balance File accuracy. An immediate problem occurred in reconciling AFB totals to physical inventories, as Material Release Orders are machine cut, resulting in the requisitioned quantity being deducted immediately from the on-hand balance. The stocks, however, are often not pulled for some time, due to backlogs of higher priority MRO's, administrative lead time, etc. Receipts created exactly the opposite problem, as they are not posted to the files until the items have been physically located, in order to avoid erroneous warehouse denials. The result, due to both procedures, is that often

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

phy hand quantities are at any given time substantially greater than the AEF
w te, although machine data is not the least in error.

(b) Evaluation: In order to insure that all releases are reconciled, it is often necessary to examine Daily Transaction Registers as far back as 45 days. A great aid in insuring that the other half of the activity, the receipts, are properly reconciled is to conduct the physical inventory several days prior to deadline, conduct the normal reconciliation process, and then hold unreconciled FSN's in suspense for a few days. When these items are then checked against the most recent DTR's, it is often found that receipts physically in location when inventoried were posted to the AEF one to three days later due to administrative processing time.

(c) Recommendation: A true determination of AEF accuracy cannot be made so long as stocks being inventoried are not frozen, as the reconciliation process will not discover all documents in float, regardless of the care with which it is undertaken. Therefore, it is recommended that, if stocks cannot be frozen for such inventories, the procedures outlined above be used in the interest of providing a more accurate, though not perfect, determination of AEF accuracy.

(4) Advance Forecasting of Ships Cargo.

(a) Observation: The ability to accurately predict receipts is necessary to attain the most efficient utilization of storage space, equipment and manpower. The review of military manifests had in the past been sufficient for normal receiving. Special problems were presented by the use of containerized shipping (Sea Land). Due to the large number of vans received and the different problems presented by varying types of cargo it was necessary to accurately predict the contents of a given van so that vans could be called forward and unstuffed most efficiently.

(b) Evaluation: By utilizing cargo codes (Mil-Stand) noted on the military manifests it is possible to predict the contents of a van before it is called forward. This allows the depot to arrange transshipment of vans directly to a customer, i. e., 69th Maint Bn and also the staging of vans in the storage areas for unloading to prevent double handling of material.

(c) Recommendation: That cargo codes (Mil-Stand) noted on the military manifests of Sea Land vans be used to predict the contents of the vans before they are called forward and to assist depots in arranging transshipment of vans directly to the customer.

(5) Storage of Hazardous Material.

(a) Observation: Warning labels and other normal precautions utilized in the shipment of hazardous chemicals such as acids, solvents and corrosive agents have not proved adequate. Items in this category require special handling and special consideration as to storage location.

(b) Evaluation: It was necessary to develop a procedure for identifying

AVCA CR-D-MOT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

these items by FSN then determine an appropriate location for this stock providing adequate segregation from other stock. This program has been given continuing command emphasis.

(c) Recommendation: That a listing be made of all hazardous materials by FSN and noun nomenclature. When material of these FSN's arrive in a depot they should be immediately segregated from the other stock and placed in areas where personnel have been given special training on the handling of such materials.

(6) Inventory Procedures.

(a) Observation: During Project Count it was possible to develop procedures for both location surveys and inventories. Actual counting accuracy and inaccuracies due to MRO's being filled on item being inventoried, both proved to be problem areas.

(b) Evaluation: The most efficient count method was found to be the use of two man teams with one man counting and the other verifying and recording. It was necessary to put special emphasis on those FSC's which were being inventoried and assure that warehouse OIC's did not process an MRO without the OIC's approval for items in these classes until the inventory was completed.

(c) Recommendation: That when inventories are being conducted, warehouse OIC's should not process any MRO's on those FSC's being inventoried without the ICO's approval.

(7) Items Subject to Pilferage.

(a) Observation: Pilferage proved to be a problem throughout the quarter. The most significant area was LN pilferage of Class I supplies from the Class I Recoup Area.

(b) Evaluation: By fencing the entire Class I Non-Perishable Storage Area and putting special emphasis on controlling LN's and preventing their loitering in these areas it was possible to prevent much of this loss.

(c) Recommendation: Special attention should be given to security of Class I Non-Perishable Storage Areas since these are most susceptible to pilferage. Use of such security measures as checking identification and establishing anti-intrusion devices should be especially encouraged in such pilferable storage area.

(8) Processing of Warehouse Denials.

(a) Observation: Previously warehouse denials were being turned in and posted when in many cases the denial was not valid. Usually this was due to the warehouse personnel not checking all of the locations listed for an FSN.

(b) Evaluation: It is necessary to keep constant command supervision on warehouse denials. A special procedure was adopted which requires the Inventory Section to verify all warehouse denials.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending
31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(c) Recommendation: Prior to warehouse denials being turned in for posting, the Inventory Section should verify the denials.

(9) Storage of Calcium Hypochlorite.

(a) Observation: Weather condition and improper manufacturer packaging was the cause of a spontaneous ignition fire of a chemical compound, calcium hypochlorite, which resulted in the loss of approximately \$70,000 worth of supplies.

(b) Evaluation: It appeared that improper packaging, packing, and/or handling had some part in causing this and other smaller fires outside the depot area in which this same chemical was involved.

(c) Recommendation: That added emphasis be placed on the inspection of proper packaging and packing of all hazardous commodities immediately upon their receipt into the depot. Storage surveillance inspections also must carefully assess this aspect, as well as proper location and segregation of such items in relation to other depot stocks.

(10) The Problem of Providing Shipping Status to USAICCV on Supply Directives and Redistribution Orders.

(a) Observation: It is extremely difficult to trace a requisition entered in the normal cycle and obtain shipping information on it. In order to maintain control over a requisition which must be answered by message as to shipping status an MRE requesting each operative section that handles the material to annotate what action they have taken and return the completed information to General Material.

(b) Evaluation: This procedure has enabled the section to provide quicker and more accurate information on shipping status requests.

(c) Recommendation: That this procedure be fully implemented and continued in the future as it results in better support to the customer and assists the customer in locating materiel that has been shipped to him.

(11) Excessive dues Outs are caused by units or customers not being assured of supply.

(a) Observation: The customer, to assure himself of supplies, keeps submitting requisitions for the same item. This type of action naturally creates excessive dues outs for that item. The units or customer are not reviewing status cards from the depot properly or this condition would not exist. Status Codes BA, BB, BC, etc. are clearly explained in AR 725-50, and 1st Logistical Command "3SVN" Standard Supply System for Class II and IV Depots. In the future files will be reviewed periodically for excessive requisitioning and those requisitions cancelled by the depot back to the unit or customer with status code "CS" rejected. Quantity requisitioned is suspect of error or indicates excessive quantity.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending
31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(b) Evaluation: The new Supply System "3SVN" will provide the unit or customer better status and will also automatically release dues-outs upon receipt of assets.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that all units submitting requests for supplies from depots become familiar with procedures for reviewing status cards and follow-up actions as outlined in AR 725-50 and the 3SVN Standard Supply System. Problems arising that are not outlined in these regulations and the 3SVN System should be brought to the attention of the depot's Customer Assistance Branch. Files and registers should be reviewed periodically for excessive quantities and supplies that are no longer needed.

(12) Numerous re-input cards were not being accepted by the computer due to erroneous coding.

(a) Observation: 3SVN coding procedure often requires usage of an "11" zone control punch. In Data Processing language, this punch is commonly referred to as an "X" punch. Personnel in all sections had been preparing key punch instruction sheets with reference to an "X" punch in certain control card columns. Key punch operators punched an "ALPHA" "X" in these columns which the computer did not recognize and therefor did not process the cards.

(b) Evaluation: The problem was brought to the attention of Data Processing personnel and after discussion on the matter, it was decided to use a uniform instruction to all coding sheets which refer to the "11" zone or "X" control punch as a dash (-) punch on the keypunch keyboard, the "Dash Skip" key causes the correct zone control punch to be punched in the card. Although this looks like a small item, an incorrect punch or code in any card column of a card means the difference between continuation or rejection of a supply action.

(c) Recommendation: None

(13) Managerial decisions on supply actions which do not process properly upon input are listed on "Open in Stock Control" listings but reinput cards are not provided to facilitate further action.

(a) Observation: When manager-decision type exceptions are received initially, cards for re-input are provided with the listings. These cards are forwarded to DPD with keypunch coding instruction. In the event of error in processing, the cards are not returned, but the actions appear as "Open in Stock Control".

(b) Evaluation: Recommend procedure be developed to either provide cards with "Open in Stock Control" listings to facilitate re-input, or initiate a modification to the computer program which would generate a follow-up card for all exception transactions which are not properly corrected and re-input within three daily work cycles after original exception. This action would greatly reduce the possibility of indefinitely suspended supply action on managerial referrals.

(c) Recommendation: None.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(14) Substitution of Class I Items.

(a) Observation: In the past it has become necessary to make various substitutions for items which are not in stock.

(b) Evaluation: There is a suitable substitute for many of the Class I items. The substitution should follow a number of criteria:

1. Is the item substituted a like item? E.g., One beef product for another beef product.

2. If substitution is for a resale item, will substitute items be accepted by customers?

3. Does the use of an item as a substitute lower the stocks of that item to a critical point?

(c) Recommendation: That when a particular FSN item is in an out of stock position, a like item be substituted since most are carried as a substitute item and not as an ASL item, and such item is usually in long supply. This is necessary to prevent deterioration or spoilage of the item due to overage in storage.

c. Training.

(1) IBM Operation.

(a) Observation: Skilled enlisted PCM operators become skilled computer operators after 30 to 45 days OJT.

(b) Evaluation: OJT proved to be a fast, efficient way to develop IBM 7010 console operators. However, the trainees were closely supervised, and there were skilled contractor personnel on duty at all times to give instructions and to answer questions.

(c) Recommendation: That future new computer installations obtain as many skilled operators as possible. Where skilled operators are not available, a small cadre of highly skilled personnel, supplemented by good PCM operators, is an acceptable substitute.

(2) Vehicle Operators and Mechanics.

(a) Observation: MOS qualified vehicle operators and mechanics are in short supply in the 109th QM Company.

(b) Evaluation: Trained, qualified operators and mechanics are more fully aware of the care necessary to maintain the vehicles in the best possible condition minimizing the deadline rate. Training new personnel, which is the only other alternative solution to the problem, has a drawback because of the shortness of a Vietnam tour.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(c) Recommendation: That MOS qualified vehicle operators and mechanics be periodically allocated to units to compensate for CONUS returnees.

(3) Training for MOS 95B.

(a) Observation: Enlisted men within Security Guard Company are promoted in MOS 95B (Military Police).

(b) Evaluation: Since these men will be assigned at their next duty station on the basis of their MOS when they DEROS, it is essential that they be thoroughly familiar with the duties of a Military Policeman. In order to provide proficiency in that MOS, the Security Guard Company initiated a Military Police Training Program for the purpose imparting a better understanding of the MP's function. The program included MP training films, lectures by senior MP NCO's, demonstrations of MP techniques, and other pertinent areas of study. In connection with this program, a group of men from the Security Guard Company recently toured the 981st Military Police Sentry Dog Company and were given a demonstration of canine capability. Owing to the circumstances surrounding the operation of the training program, it is impossible to completely train the new MP; however, a strong background is provided which permits the men to perform their duties more proficiently while in Vietnam and also helps them assume different type of work when reassigned to CONUS as a 95B.

(c) Recommendation: It is obvious that a similar situation exists in other companies where EM are promoted in MOS's of which the individuals may have little or no knowledge of the duties performed. Continuous training of personnel to achieve MOS proficiency should be a responsibility of all unit commanders and especially in those instances when EM have been reclassified as a result of promotion.

d. Intelligence. None

e. Logistics.

(1) Transportation Time.

(a) Observation: In the past, the problem of shipment reaching destination by RDD has been a problem. Many items were still in the depot up to 20 days past RDD.

(b) Evaluation: After discussing this problem with transportation it was discovered that cargo had been booked with too high a priority. To solve this, the end stations were given a 25 day order ship time for non-perishable cargo and 10 day order ship time for perishable items. It is now a policy for end stations to submit their requisitions on a weekly basis. All normal requisitions are given a priority 03 for non-perishable and 02 for perishable cargo.

(c) Recommendation: That since the present transportation priority has ensured our customers of receipt prior to RDD, that transportation try to deliver the product no earlier than seven days prior to RDD. Further recommend that transportation command ensure that TCMD's and MRO's arrive at the destination with the product since all end stations supplied with Class I from Cam Ranh Depot state that 90% of the time they don't receive TCMD's or MRO's from the transportation media.

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(2) Delayed unit pick-ups at the Depot Class II shipping yard have resulted in storage problems at the yard.

(a) Observation: Many Depot supported units which are expected to pick up requested supplies at the Depot Class II shipping yard have left supplies in the shipping yard for excessive periods of time. Because of the lack of space in the shipping area, it became necessary to return the supplies to depot stock. Wanting to give the customer every opportunity to receive his supplies, a letter was prepared informing the customer of the supplies on hand at shipping and advising him of the date that the supplies would be returned to stock. These letters were prepared in duplicate at shipping and forwarded to Customer Assistance for action. One copy of each letter was placed in a suspense file and the second copy was either hand carried or mailed by registered mail to the unit. On the suspense date the file copy of the letter was returned to Shipping. If the supplies had not been picked up by the unit then all items were returned to stock.

(b) Evaluation: Since the implementation of this procedure approximately 96% of the letters delivered have resulted in action being taken by the unit notified to remove his supplies from the shipping area.

(c) Recommendation: That this procedure be fully implemented in all Depot SOP's as it results in less items being returned to stock and assists the customers in making timely pick-ups.

(3) Summarization of monthly Red Ball Requisitions passed to the ICC.

(a) Observation: It was desired to establish a system to accumulate and summarize the demand of all Red Ball requisitions passed by Depot to the ICC. This summarization would be used as a management tool by the DSU's, Depot, and 1st Logistical Command.

(b) Evaluation: The VI cards from each Red Ball requisition passed were duplicated and accumulated for a month at a time. At the end of each period, the cards are sequenced by repair part FSN's and listed on a five part-out. A summarization, to include number of demands and quantity demanded is included for each FSN with two (2) or more demands.

(c) Recommendation: That this practice be implemented and utilized by all depots who are submitting Red Ball Requisitions to the ICC.

(4) Summarization by End Item of Red Ball Requisitions Passed.

(a) Observation: Summarization of all Red Ball requisitions passed for certain critical end items was desired by the Unserviceable Property Division of Depot. This listing would be used as a management tool to determine which demands could be satisfied by stocks on hand in the cannibalization point.

(b) Evaluation: The duplicate VI cards used for the regular summary of passed requisitions will be consolidated by end item FSN and listed on a print-out. Nineteen (19) FSN's of critical end items were included in the program. They include $\frac{1}{4}$ ton, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, and 5 ton trucks and tractors.

AVCA CR-D-MGT

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending 31 January, 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

(c) Recommendation: That this practice be implemented and utilized by all depots.

f. Organization. None

g. Other.

(1) Unit Mess Halls.

(a) Observation: Consolidating of unit messes often necessitated that the new mess hall feed more than twice the number it was designed to feed. Various methods were tested in an attempt to reduce the feeding time.

(b) Evaluation: By converting the serving line to self-service rather than being served by KP's, the serving time was reduced by one-third. By prohibiting the troops from smoking in the messhall, feeding time was reduced by nearly twelve minutes per meal.

(c) Recommendation: None

(2) Sumps and Drainage.

(a) Observation: In this environment the present drainage system is inadequate.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the heavy rain and extreme amount of sand in the area, there is inadequate draining and seeping of used water in existing sumps.

(c) Recommendation: That a study be made by fully qualified personnel as to the possibility of a sewage pipe system for drainage of all shower facilities in the Cam Ranh Cantonment Areas.



R. M. HERMANN
COL, QMC
Commanding

6 Inclosures

- ~~1. Awards and Decorations~~
- ~~2. Reenlistment Rates~~
- ~~3. Mail & Distribution~~
- ~~4. Enlisted Promotions~~
- ~~5. Courts Martial~~
- ~~6. Distinguished Visitors~~

Incl 1 - 6 wd Hq DA

AVCA GRB-00-0 (5 Feb 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period
Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, APO 96312 24 MAR 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA 00-0, APO 96384

This headquarters concurs with the Operational Report of the US Army Depot with the following exceptions:

a. Reference Section II, paragraph 2b(1): Nonconcur. USARV Regulation 525-3 directs that procedures will be established to reconcile TCMD's prepared by the terminals and receipted for at destinations. For shipments by convoys, the Convoy Commander is required to return one receipted copy of each TCMD to the Movements Control Center (MCC) who will forward these copies to the shipper for reconciliation.

b. Reference Section II, paragraph 2b(4): Concur. This headquarters feels that Federal Stock Numbers are needed on Sea Land Manifests for a more effective visibility of cargo in the pipeline. This request was brought to the attention of a MACV representative on 11 March 1969 at a briefing concerning containership operations. A possibility for honoring this request could not be projected.


c. Reference Section II, paragraph 2e(1): (1) Nonconcur. The transportation system does its utmost to deliver all cargo as soon as possible, but no later than the RDD. Based upon the "normal" delivery time to a given consignee, US Army Depot could withhold offering until ten days prior to the RDD and then offer shipment as TP 02. This would control delivery of non-perishables to a ten day or less prior RDD.

(2) Nonconcur. MRO's are attached to or packed with the cargo. Their arrival at destination depends on how well the shipper affixes them.

(3) Concur. As the driver must get a signature on his TCMD prior to releasing the cargo which will relinquish him from responsibility for it, the TCMD in all cases goes forward with the cargo. The carrier has been instructed to insure that all drivers leave a copy of the TCMD with whom-ever signs for the cargo. The end station might also instruct their personnel who signs for the cargo to ask for a copy of the TCMD should the driver not offer one.

d. Reference Section II, paragraph 2g(2): Concur. Recommendation mentioned was accomplished almost two years ago and the project request submitted to USARV for approval and funding. Action by USARV to date has been negative on an approval.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


L. W. SHERRILL JR.
1 LT, AGC
ASST AG

26

CF: US Army Depot

AVCA GO-MH (5 Feb 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the United States Army
Depot, Cam Ranh Bay for Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65.

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 19 APR 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, United States Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning additional personnel to perform operator maintenance on overhead vehicles, section II, page 16, paragraph a (3). Nonconcur. 1st echelon maintenance is the responsibility of operator personnel. Additional personnel cannot be authorized for this purpose. 1st Logistical Command circular 310-4 informs subordinate commands of proper procedures for obtaining additional personnel to handle increased workloads.

b. Reference item concerning the use of Local Nationals, section II, page 16, paragraph a(5). Concur. Any training device that enhances the training effort of Local Nationals should be employed.

c. Reference item concerning reconciliation of cargo shipments, section II, page 17, paragraph b(1). Concur with recommendation. This headquarters constantly strives to improve cargo reconciliation. There is a definite requirement for publication of pertinent regulations at USARV, or higher headquarters, to further implement the present system of cargo reconciliation.

d. Reference item concerning "Open in Stock Control" listings, section II, page 21, paragraph b(13). Nonconcur with evaluation. The Open in Stock Control listing provides a notation to the manager indicating the number of times an item has appeared on the listing. Managers are provided re-input cards upon initial rejection of exception; they should review the entire document for possible errors other than that for which the document was rejected. Providing a card for each time the Open in Stock Control listing is printed would create an additional computer workload, create a physical handling problem for the managers, and increase the likelihood of duplicate reentry cards entering the computer systems.

e. Reference item concerning transportation time, section II, page 23, paragraph e(1). Nonconcur. Shipping activities are responsible to determine validity of requisition and urgency of need. Based on the urgency of need, cargo should be offered to transportation using a realistic RDD. Based on

AVCA GO-MH (5 Feb 69) 2d Ind

11 APR 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the United States Army
Depot, Cam Ranh Bay for Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65.

this realistic RDD, the transportation priority will be established and current transportation delivery times are adequate to have cargo delivered prior to RDD. Holding shipments back to increase transportation priorities tend to delay shipment because all unrealistic priorities are subject to challenge.

f. Reference item concerning summarization by end item of Red Ball requisitions passed, section II, pages 24 and 25, paragraph e(4). Concur. The recommendation is valid for Red Ball Requisitions for class IX items. However, Red Ball requisitions are not to be used for requisitioning end items.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

for

C. D. Stafford, 110, ACC

LANNY K KELSEY

11 - ACC

Asst Adjutant General

CF:

USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay

USA Depot, Cam Ranh Bay

ACHGC-DST (5 Feb 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army Depot,
Cam Ranh for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (HCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 MAY 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, United States Army Depot, Cam Ranh.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Reconciliation of Cargo Shipments, section II, page 17, paragraph 2b(1); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph a, and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2c; nonconcur. USARV Regulation 525-2 directs that procedures be established to reconcile Transportation Control Movement Documents (TCMD). 1st Logistical Command regulation 525-2 establishes reconciliation procedures. A message will be dispatched to all USARV commands requesting transportation control movement documents be returned in accordance with 1st Logistical Command procedures. No action required by higher headquarters.

b. Reference item concerning Advance Forecasting of Ship's Cargo, section II, page 18, paragraph 2b(4), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph b; concur. Cargo codes (MIL-STAND) noted on the military manifests of Sea Land Vans are used to make a distribution plan for vans prior to the arrival of vessels as noted in basic report. Nonconcur with recommendation made in the 1st Indorsement concerning addition of Federal Stock Numbers (FSN) to the manifest as containers normally are filled with mixed lots or a variety of small components. The addition of FSN's would expand the present manifest to an unmanageable document. Ship Status Cards from COMUS and the present manifest provide sufficient data for planning distribution of vans and contents. No action required by higher headquarters.

c. Reference item concerning Weekly Inventory Verification by Quality Control Division, section II, page 17-18, paragraph 2b(3); concur. The observation contained in paragraph 2b(3)(a) is not entirely correct. The statement concerning Material Release Orders (MRO) is correct. However, posting of receipts to the Available Balance Files (ABF) after physically placing supplies on location will result in the same problem, not the opposite as stated (i.e. physical on-hand balance will be greater than ABF balances.) The procedure outlined in the evaluation paragraph is satisfactory and should result in the degree of accuracy required to carry on supply operations.

d. Reference item concerning Sumps and Drainage, section II, page 25,

AVHGC-DST (5 Feb 69) 3d Ind

2 MAY 1969

SUBJECT: Operational report of Headquarters United States Army Depot
Cam Ranh for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (A1)

paragraph 2;(2), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph a; concur. A study of the inadequate drainage system at Cam Ranh Bay has been accomplished. Appropriate action has been initiated. No action required by higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. C. FENL
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

By turn:
US Army Depot, Cam Ranh
1st log comd

GPOP-DT (5 Feb 69) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Depot Cam Ranh for Period
Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310		Unclassified
		2b. GROUP
3. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, US Army Depot Cam Ranh		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CO, US Army Depot Cam Ranh		
6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
5 February 1969	34	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO.	691199	
c. N/A	9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		

32

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification